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Waldron: The Role Of The Montana Supreme Court In Constitutional Revision

THE ROLE OF THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT IN
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
Ellis Waldron*

Dr. Waldron was a member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
Commission that made preparations for the Constitutional Convention
of 1972. He has contributed twice previously to the Montana Law Review,
and to the Wisconsin Law Review. In 1963-64 he was a Fellow in Law
and Political Science in the Harvard Law School. He says his Ph.D. dissertation, "The Public Purpose Doctrine of Taxation," tracked state appellate judges through a century of implied constitutional limitation as they
read into their state charters things the constitutions did not say, to limit
the political discretion of citizens, legislators and local governments.
1.

INTRODUCTION:

Courts and Constitutional Revision
American tradition regards written constitutions as "higher law"
to which the agencies of government and ordinary statutory and case
law must conform. The constitutions have their own special "rules of
change"' that differ from rules for change of statutory and common
law, and this distinction is attested by the fact that they are commonly
set apart in a special article of the constitution. Article V of the United
States Constitution drafted in 1787 may have fixed the style; Article XIX
of Montana's statehood charter set out the rules for "Future Amendments" and Article XIV of the new constitution concerns "Constitutional
Revision." But the segregated placement of these rules in the constitution is symbolic rather than determinative of their distinctive character.
These distinctive rules reflect the ultimately theoretical or principled
view that change of "organic law" is a specialized process for performing a unique and particularly responsible function in a representative
system of government. Deepest traditions of social contract theory and
historic notions of popular sovereignty are involved, and these were
eloquently expressed in Article III § 2 of Montana's 1889 declaration of
rights. It said that "the people of the state have the sole and exclusive
right ... to alter and abolish their constitution and form of government,
whenever they may deem it necessary to their safety and happiness"
subject to conformity with the United States Constitution and, obviously,
with the rules of change decreed in Article XIX for constitutional

*Professor of Political Science, University of Montana.
'The term is suggested by H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 93 (1963) who uses it for
''secondary" rules (rules about rules) required to overcome static qualities in the
"'primary" rules (rules about how people behave). Rules governing processes for
constitutional change would be a special form of secondary rules.
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revision. Article II § 2 of the 1972 constitution carries forward the
concept in almost identical language.
The earliest utterances of the Montana supreme court on constitutional revision in the 1890s recognized the distinctive function involved,
and the distinctive nature of the processes to be observed. In 1894 and
again in 1899 a unanimous court rejected arguments that rules of statutory construction should limit Article XIX; the court said that legislators proposing changes in 'organic law" were "mere machinists operating intermediate machinery" who could not alter "the single mode of
'2
proceeding which the people have directly prescribed.
The earliest state constitutions were difficult to revise, but nineteenth century experience with over-rigid constitutional texts led quite
generally to relaxation of the rules for constitutional revision. When
the Montana constitution of 1889 was drafted, its arrangements for
proposal of constitutional change by extraordinary legislative majorities
and ratification of such proposals by simple majority of voters were
close to the norm. In one respect the Montana constitution was more
difficult to revise than many of its contemporaries: no more than three
amendments might be proposed for ratification at one time.3
With a few early nineteenth century exceptions, the executive had
no formal role in the proposal or adoption of constitutional changes.
By 1910 the leading authority on state constitutional revision could say
"the doctrine is well-established that executive approval is not required
for the legislative proposal of constitutional amendments."'4 That rule
had been clear for the national Constitution since 1798 when the United
States Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment had been
5
properly ratified without submission to the president.
Judicial intervention in the processes of state constitutional revision
developed rather suddenly in the last decades of the nineteenth century.
2

State ex rel. Woods v. Tooker, 15 Mont. 8, 37 P. 840 (1894) invalidated the first
proposed amendment to the constitution after a favorable vote on ratification; at
842 the court said "we seem to be in a somewhat different field than that suggested by relators' counsel as to the construction of statutes." Durfee v. Harper,
22 Mont. 354, 56 P. 582 (1899) held another proposed amendment to have been
improperly proposed by the legislature; the court said at 585 that while statutes
derive their force from enactment by legislators who are 'supreme in the exercise
of a constitutional lawmaking power," constitutional revision ''obtains life [only]
by the direct power of the people.''

8W. DODD, Tn

REVISION AND AMENDMENT OP STATE CONSTITUTIONS 134-136 (1910)

[hereinafter cited as Dodd], classifies the state constitution of the time according
to relative difficulty of amendment. He may have underestimated the restrictive
effect of the Montana three-amendment limitation; see Waldron, "Constitutional
Issues of 1968,"

MONTANA PUBLIc AFFAIRS REPORT No. 4 (October

1968),

Bureau

of Government Research, University of Montana, suggesting that the limitation was
qualitative as well as quantitative; three proposals rarely survived the bicameral
hurdles and those that did tended to be non-controversial if not trivial. This may
have been a fator in the ratification rate of 68 per cent for 57 amendments voted
upon from 1894 to 1972.
'DODD,supra note 3 at 150.151.
5
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/3
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There appears to have been one case prior to 1880 in which a state
court held a constitutional amendment to have been improperly adopted,
and "up to 1890 probably not more than twenty such cases had come
before the courts."6 The propriety of such judicial intervention was
not uncontested at the time, and a literate but legally unsophisticated
reader of the Montana constitution might wonder, if the people have
"sole and exclusive right" to change their constitution with legislative
assistance, how the state's courts got into the act at all. They did, to
nullify three of the five amendments proposed during the first decade
of statehood. Such was the trend of the times. By 1910 it was "the
settled rule that, in the absence of specific and definite constitutional
provisions which vest the final decision in some other officer or department, the judicial authority of the state extends over every step in the
amending process."- This assumption of authority by the courts reflected
the sweep of judicial review in the state courts during the last half of
the nineteenth century. It does not appear that the language of Article
III § 2 ever was pleaded to exclude Montana courts from the process
of constitutional revision, although its language might seem to warrant
such a plea of exception to the "settled rule" just quoted.
In any event the Montana supreme court, from its earliest nullification decisions, has been involved more than a dozen times in the
process of revising the state constitution. The constitution of 1972 bears
the marks of this intervention in several explicit provisions that repudiate some of the court's decisions about change of the 1889 charter. This
essay examines the performance of the modern court in this intervention,
concluding that it has been notably "activist" in its willingness to become
involved in the processes of constitutional revision, and notably "conservative" in its view of the power of the people and their constituted
representatives to change basic constitutional rules. Abandoning the
wisdom of the early court on such matters, the modern justices have
achieved this stance by failure or refusal to respect fundamental differences in function and process that distinguish constitutional revision
from ordinary legislative processes.
The 1972 constitution is notably easier to amend than the predecessor,8 and its liberalized "rules of change" doubtless contributed to Time

ODODD,

supra note 3 at 211-212 n. 157.

7id. at 211.
8
Constitutional revision is easier under the 1972 constitution than the 1889 constitution in the following respects:
(1)
popular initiative of constitutional amendments (art. XIV, § 9) and for a
constitutional convention (art. XIV, § 2) where the 1889 constitution required special
legislative majorities to initiate either.
(2)
popular vote every 20 years whether to hold a constitutional convention
(art. XIV, § 3).
(3)
i1olimitation on the number of amendments that can be submitted and
considered for adoption at one time.
(4)
ratification of proposals from a constitutional convention by a majority
of electors voting "thereon"
(art. XIV,
§ 7) rather1974
than "at the election."
Published
by ScholarWorks at University
of Montana,
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magazine's description of it as "populist." 9 But that characterization was
singularly inept for the judicial structure that was carried forward
virtually unchanged into the new constitution-a judiciary that will
sometimes review application and observance of the new rules for constitutional revision. 10 The new constitution seeks to close some of the
doors to judicial intervention in constitutional revision that the Montana
supreme court found or fabricated' under the 1889 constitution. Yet
the threshold for judicial intervention in constitutional revision remains
notably wide so long as two lively exercises of the modern court stand
undisturbed:
1) In leading cases in 1960 and 1972, the court held that rules
for constitutional revision are limited by rules for the legislative process,
if legislative rules are not expressly excluded from application to constitutional change. This rule has not been repudiated by terms of the
new constitution or by the sitting court, all of whose members concurred in the 1972 decision; patently the rule overhangs interpretation
of Article XIV in the new constitution.
2) The incumbent court wielded its power of contempt against
the lawyer-president of the 1972 convention when he felt his position
required him to criticize the court's application of the rule just mentioned to activities of elected convention delegates. The court has given
no indication that it may not again employ this fearsome and readilyabused contempt power against any lawyer in public office who dares
publicly to criticize the court for the way it exercises its judicial powers.
The new constitution continues the historic immunity of legislators "for
any speech or debate in the legislature" (1972 Constitution, Article V
§ 8) but the protection is limited to utterance in legislative chambers
and there is no comparable protection for convention delegates.
Some terms must be defined. As used in this essay, "activism" or

delegates to a convention need not convene within three months after their
(5)
election. This will allow more time for preparation by elected delegates before they
formally convene.
ratification election after proposal of changes by a convention need not
(6)
occur within six months as required by 1889 constitution.
(7) two-thirds of entire legislative membership 'whether one or more bodies"
can propose amendments (art. XIV, § 8) or submit the question whether to call a
convention (art. XIV, § 1). The 1889 constitution required two-thirds of the elected
members of each house to propose such actions.
QTIME, April 10, 1972 at 18.
ICompare MONT. CONST. art. VIII (1889) and MONT. CONST. art. VII (1972). Subsequent references are to the 1889 constitution unless the 1972 constitution is expressly indicated. See Sullivan, "The Judiciary," in Montana's Proposed Constitution of 1972, MONTANA PUBLIC AFFAIRS REPORT No. 11, 9-10 (April 1972), Bureau
of Government Research, University of Montana.
1
'G. & C. MERRIAM CO., WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1973): "Fabricate
1. Construct, manufacture; specif: to construct from diverse and usually standardized
parts. 2. invent, create." But not "3. t make up for the purpose of deception."
The Montana supreme court recognizes Webster's Dictionary for signification of
constitutional terms, e.g. State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray, 137 Mont. 557, 354
P.2d 552, 556 (1960).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/3
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"restraint" are terms that characterize a court's approach to decision
of a case. One or more of several specific contexts appear in the Montana cases:
1) jurisdictional: the supreme court citation of constitutional convention president Graybill for possible contempt was an egregious courtinitiated instance of judicial activism in the jurisdictional sense.
2) judicial review: reversal of the not unreasonable judgment of
the legislature or convention as constituted agencies for revision. The
1960 Livingstone case is the most significant instance.
3) doctrinal innovation: search for a ground of decision different
from conventional approaches. The Kvaalen decision limiting post-adjournment expenditures of convention delegates on grounds found in
legislative Article V rather than amending Article XIX or in mere
statutory interpretation is a provocative instance.
"Conservative" and "liberal" are terms employed to characterize
the nature of the judicial decision, in relation to the scope allowed
agencies of constitutional revision to exercise that function. A "conservative" decision limits the scope or freedom to revise by finding
limitations beyond those expressly stated in the rules of revision. The
"presumption" lies against the validity of the method or activity employed to revise the constitution and the net effect is to preserve the
constitutional status quo. By contrast "liberal" interpretation presumes
the validity of revision activity by legislator, delegate or voters; it
restricts the revision activity only when some clearly relevant rule of
change is violated beyond reasonable doubt. The "presumption" favors
validity of the challenged revision activity and the opportunity for
constitutional change is widened. Our use of the terms "conservative"
and "liberal" is not far removed from the notions of "strict" or "literal"
construction versus "liberal" construction of statutes and constitutional
provisions used by Dodd in the leading study of state constitutional
12
revision.
How should a court interpret the rules for constitutional revision?
The view of this essay is that the notion of "strict" versus "liberal"
construction leads nowhere or anywhere, depending whether the court
emphasizes one element or another of a rule, one rule or another among
applicable rules, one guide or another to interpretation. 13 The point may
supra note 3 at 216-217 identified the '(strict view which subjects the amending process to control by ordinary legislation, and which if adhered to would greatly
restrict the legislative power of proposing amendments.''
131d. at 217: "[T]he judicial construction of the amending clause has usually been
liberal, and has resolved doubts in favor of the validity of amendments approved
by the people." But "discussing the strict or liberal interpretation of the amending
clause, it should perhaps be said that the same court may at one time be liberal
and at another strict. The function of passing upon the validity of laws or proposed
amendments is primarily political, not judicial, and where the opinion of a court
happens to be opposed to a proposal it is usually not difficult to find some reason
for declaring such proposal invalid."
UDODD,
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be illustrated by the Montana court's choice among available constitutional guides to interpretation in the constitutional revision cases. The
1889 constitution afforded a "liberal" principle and a "conservative"
principle by which to interpret the rules of constitutional change set
forth in Article XIX.
Article III § 2 affirmed the "sole and exclusive right" of the people
to "alter and abolish their constitution and form of government" within
the limitations imposed by the United States constitution and, of course,
the rules of change in Article XIX. This expansive language explicitly
addressed the problem of constitutional change and seemed to support
both judicial "restraint" and judicial "liberalism" in revision cases. The
Montana court cited this provision as a guide in two early cases that
developed notions of "substantial" rather than "literal" compliance with
procedural requirements of Article XIX. But that doctrine was repudiated in 1934 and Article III, § 2 has never been cited by the modern
supreme court as having relevance to the constitutional revision process.
Article III § 29 said provisions of the constitution were "mandatory
and prohibitory" unless otherwise expressly declared. This oracular conceptual mare's nest was classical support for "activist" judicial intervention and, conceivably, for "conservative" decision. The Montana
court frequently invoked it in those modes, and made it one of the constitutional pegs for the 1960 decision that enjoined three proposed constitutional amendments from the ratification ballot.
Seven times from 1894 to 1934 the Montana supreme court accepted
requests to test the proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments against the requirements of Article XIX § 9 that regulated constitutional amendment. Five of the cases involved claims that there
had been procedural errors in legislative proposal of the amendments,
or in official advertising of the proposals prior to the ratification election.
Three of these five claims were sustained ;14 the first and second, in the
1890s, nullified amendments that had been ratified, and the last in 1934
enjoined submission of a proposed amendment to the voters. The third
and fourth cases sustained amendments that had been ratified, finding
that compliance with procedural requirements had been sufficiently
"substantial" to sustain their validity. 15 Three of the seven cases asked
the court, after ratification of an amendment, to find that it should have
been submitted as two or more proposals. This appeal was a somewhat
tenuous argument that Article XIX, requiring separate numbering and

"State ex rel. Woods v. Tookei, supra note 2 (insufficient publication of proposed
amendment before ratification election) ; Durfee v. Harper, supra note 2 (insufficient
entry of proposed amendment in legislative journals); Tipton v. Mitchell, 97 Mont.
420, 355 P.2d 110 (1934) (insufficient entry of proposed amendment in legislative
journals).
'State ex rel. Hay v. Alderson, 49 Mont. 387, 142 P. 210 (1914) (publication of
proposed amendnent before ratification election); Martien v. Porter, 68 Mont. 450,
219 P. 817 (1923) (adequacy of entry of proposed amendment in legislative journals).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/3
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vote when "more amendments than one" were submitted in a single
election, also required separate submission of separable propositions.
The court refused to second-guess the legislature on allowable scope
of a proposed amendment; in each instance it found sufficient unity of
purpose to sustain the proposal. 16
Among these earlier decisions the approach of the court was "activist" by tests of this essay in developing the "liberal" notion that "substantial compliance" with constitutional requirements of procedure would
suffice. This doctrinal development was expressly repudiated in the
last case of the earlier series, in 1934.17 In general the earlier cases seem
unexceptionable and not notably ideological by any of the norms employed in this essay. A quarter-century elapsed before another case
challenged the constitutional revision process in 1960. This action introduced the modern court to review of constitutional revision processes
and set the scene for five court actions involving the constitutional
convention of 1972 and ratification of its product.
2.

The Court Limits Article XIX by
Article V: Livingstone (1960)

Prior to 1960 the Montana supreme court had interpreted provisions
of Article XIX § 9 for proposal and ratification of constitutional amendments rigorously enough to invalidate three of the seven challenged
attempts at amendment. It had looked beyond the confines of the rules
of change in Article XIX only to recognize one or the other of the two
guides to constitutional interpretation that appeared in Article III, the
declaration of rights.
In 1960 the supreme court enjoined three proposed amendments
from the general election ballot, holding that legislative proposals of
constitutional amendments must go to the governor on their way to the
people.' 8 It reached this holding despite: (1) silence of the amendment
article about executive involvement; (2) explicit legislative judgment
to the contrary buttressed by opinion of the attorney general; and (3)
overwhelming weight of constitutional theory and practice to the contrary elsewhere for more than a century. The court held that language
of a section in legislative Article V must govern the process of constitutional revision in Article XIX because proposals of constitutional
amendments were not expressly exempted by the legislative article, from
the scope of its requirements for legislative process. To reach this hold-

"State ex rel. Teague v. Silver Bow Commissioners, 34 Mont. 426, 87 P. 450 (1906);
State ex rel. Hay v. Alderson, supra note 15; State ex rel. Corry v. Cooney, 70 Mont.
355, 225 P. 1007 (1924).
17The "substantial compliance" notion was enunciated in State ex rel. Hay v. Alderson, supra note 15 at 216; the majority in Martien v. Porter, supra note 15 at 822
relied in part on doctrine; Tipton v. Mitchell, supra note 14 at 114 unanimously
repudiated the doctrine.
'State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray, supra note 11.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1974
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ing it had to ignore equally applicable language in the legislative article
whose recognition would have denied the entire basis of its holding.
This remarkable decision of four members of the court in Livingstone established the conceptual framework for judicial review of activities of the constitutional convention of 1972. The two senior incumbent
justices, who happen also to have dissented from the 1972 holding that
the new constitution had been ratified, were members of the four-member
majority that decided Livingstone in 1960. That litigation is best approached on the doctrinal ground the court itself chose for decision.
This brief paragraph was the fulcrum of the decision:
[1] Some contention was made that certain articles of the Constitution [presumably Article XIX §§ 8 and 9] were in some way
separate and distinct from the rest of the Constitution. [2] However,
the Constitution, like a statute, must be considered as a whole. [3]
The division of our Constitution into sections, articles and chapters [ !]
is a mere matter of convenience for reference purposes and is of no
9
significance in applying rules of construction and interpretation."

The first "contention" sentence requires exploration in detail, but the
second and third sentences can be more briefly addressed. The second
sentence was an ambiguous maxim from the judicial grab-bag to introduce the third sentence, a dictum that had appeared in some Montana
tax cases construing the meaning of sections within Article XII on
"Revenue and Taxation" in relation to each other and the single subject
of taxation. To apply a proposition from that narrow context to one
involving relationships between separate articles on legislation and constitutional revision was, to say the least, creative. How the judicial
acorn from the tax cases grew into Livingstone is quite a story.
History and usage, however uncertain their message, cannot be
ignored. In Montana, at least since 1897, the legislature had in fact
submitted bills proposing constitutional amendments to the governor
for approval or, presumably, for veto. This practice may have been a
cautious deference to a court that had nullified early attempts at amendment on some showing of procedural irregularity. Article XIX made
no reference to such submission of proposed amendments to the governor,
but two sections of the legislative article just might be construed to
include proposals of constitutional amendments because they had not
expressly excluded such proposals. The first was Article V, § 40 that
eventually furnished a constitutional peg for Livingstone. It said:
'Od. at 555-556, citing State ex rel. Hinz v. Moody, 71 Mont. 473, 230 P. 575 (1924)
and Cruse v. Fischl, 55 Mont. 258, 175 P. 878 (1918). The third sentence was
from Hilger v. Moore, 56 Mont. 146, 182 P. 477, 480 (1919) which seems to have
cited T. CoOLEY, CONrSITUTIONAL LImITATIONS 91 (no edition indicated) as the
source. The Hinz opinion repeated the language about "the division of our Constitution into chapters and sections" as a "mere matter of convenience" in quota-

tions from Hilger and cites T.

COOLEY,

CONSTITUTIoNAL LIMITATIONS

(7th edition)

at 91. This edition is not available to the author. Of course there were no "chapters" in the 1889 constitution; but so great was the authority of Cooley, it would
seem, that the quotation was persuasive whether it hit facts or not. Thus the language
about "chapters"
made its way perhaps from Cooley through Hilger to Hinz to
Livingstone.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/3
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Every order, resolution or vote, in which the concurrence of both
houses may be necessary, except on the question of adjournment, or
relating solely to the transaction of the business of the two houses,
shall be presented to the governor, and before it shall take effect be
approved by him, or, being disapproved, be repassed by two-thirds
of both houses, as prescribed in the case of a bill.

The language is very close to that of Article I, § 7 (3) of the United
States Constitution of 1789, differing primarily by addition in Montana
of the second exception about business of the two houses. Virtually the
same language also appeared in the Pennsylvania constitution of 1873
(Article III, § 26), and in those of Alabama (Article V, § 125), Maine
(Article IV, Pt. 3 § 2) and Rhode Island (Amended Article XV).
In 1798 the United States Supreme Court rejected a contention that
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution was a nullity

because Congress has not sent it to the president before submission to
the states, under terms of Article I, § 7 respecting "every order, resolution or vote." Justice Chase abruptly dismissed the contention:
There can, surely, be no necessity to answer that argument.
The negative of the president applies only to the ordinary cases of
legislation. He has nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption,
of amendments to the constitution.'

A century later the Pennsylvania supreme court took the same
position on a comparable claim that its version of the requirement had
been violated by failure to submit a proposed amendment to the governor. The Greist decision reiterated what seemed to be universal acceptance of the Hollingsworth rationale-that proposal and ratification of
amendments was not legislation but something else, to which strictures
on the legislative process simply did not apply. Amendment provisions
esstablished "a system entirely complete in itself" that is distinct and
separate" from lawmaking.21 The Pennsylvania governor had no role in
the amendment process.
Article XIX of the Montana constitution required no particular
form for proposal of amendments; the legislature employed bills for the
purpose. The executive veto provision of Article VII, § 12 started with
the following statement: "Every bill passed by the legislative assembly
shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor. If he approve, he shall sign it. . .

."

Veto provisions of the United States Con-

stitution (Article I. § 7 (2)) and of 42 other state constitutions start
with identical or comparable language about "every bill passed." Seventeen of these veto provisions appear in legislative articles, and 27
including Montana in the executive article. Proposals of constitutional
amendments are not expressly excepted from terms of these veto articles;

yet nowhere, apparently, have proposals of constitutional amendments
been included among "every bill" subject to veto. Hollingsworth in 1798
may have established that understanding, which certainly comported
OPHollingsworth v. Virginia, supra note 5 at 382.
-Commonwealth
v. Greist,
196 Pa. 396,
46 A. 505,1974
506
Published
by ScholarWorks
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with common assumptions aboout the special importance and distinctive
nature of the constitutional revision process.
In 1906 the first section of Montana's legislative Article V was
amended to provide for popular initiative and voter-initiated referendum
as "direct legislation." This sentence was included: "The veto power
of the governor shall not extend to measures referred to the people by
the legislative assembly or by initiative [or] referendum petitions." The
"or" preceding "initiative" clearly distinguished "measures" originating
in the legislature and referred to the people, from either initiative petitions or referendum petitions that followed the first "or. '22 Two kinds
of "measures" originating in the legislature and referred to the people
were well enough known in 1906: proposals of constitutional amendments, and statutes enacted by the legislature to become effective only
upon approval by the people-sometimes called "legislative" referenda.
Both of these kinds of "measures" along with both modes of direct
legislation were exempted from the governor's veto by language that
seemed "clear, direct and unambiguous, in the English language"-to
2
borrow the Livingstone court's description of § 40 in the same article. 3
So here is how things seemed to stand, from 1906: if constitutional
provisions outside Article XIX regulated its process for proposal of
amendments, then the original language of Article V § 40 regarding
"every order, resolution, or vote" might have subjected proposed amendments to veto; but Article V § 1 as amended now exempted them from
veto; if the two provisions of Article V were in conflict the provision
later adopted would prevail on the presumption that the people knew
what they were doing when they adopted it.
Relationships within Article V might be stated another way: exemption of certain "measures" from veto in § 1 must exempt proposals of

nThe second ''or" between "initiative" and ''referendum'' obviously belonged there
since no such thing as an 'initiative referendum petition" existed. But the state
lived without the word for more than 60 years and the fact that the last portion of
the sentence was literal nonsense may not have affected the Livingstone case since
the majority chose to ignore existence, or at least relevance, of the entire sentence.
How the word disappeared and reappeared has a curious history. The typewritten
engrossed copy of H. B. 286, 1905 Legislative Assembly that proposed the amendment contained this conjunction of letters: [no spaces] "by Initiative or Referendum . . ." The word "Initiative" was squeezed in between "by" and "or"
over
an erasure. But the handwritten enrolled version of the bill omitted the "or"
after "Initiative"
and so it went to the governor for signature and subsequently
appeared in the Revised Codes of 1907, 1921, 1935 and 1947 through the most
recent pocket part of 1973. The second "or"
did not appear in official pamphlet
reprints of the constitution issued in the 1940s and 1950s, in the author's possession.
But in 1967 the second "or"
finally appeared in an official pamphlet edition of
the constitution printed by Allen Smith Company, publishers of the Revised Codes
of Montana. In a letter to the author October 29, 1973, President Robert C. Lewis
explained: "Apparently, I believed at the time that the omission of the word was
a typographical error on our page proofs. Our regular procedure for making corrections in the text of laws printed in the Montana Codes is to bracket any words
inserted or changed and to add an explanatory compiler's note. Obviously, the
regular procedure was not followed in this case."
'State ex rel.Livingstone v. Murray, supra note 11 at 556.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/3
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constitutional revision from veto fully as much as either § 40 or Article
VII § 12 would subject them to veto. The matter can be put still another
way: Article V § 1 exempted a special and limited class of "measures
referred by the legislature to the people" from veto. The particularity
of that provision should prevail against the generality of Article V § 40
("every order, resolution or vote") or of Article VII § 2 ("every bill
passed") if the mode of construction was to include proposals of constitutional amendments within the reach of any of them. We will note
the curioous treatment of the exception clause in Article V, § 1 by all
parties and the court in Livingstone.
In 1943 Governor Ford addressed the problem of Article V when
he wanted to veto proposal of a constitutional amendment that had
been submitted to him. "I was without volition in the matter," he said,
"in the face of the words contained in Section 1 of Article V of the
constitution [quoting the provision] . . . There is no provision requiring
the approval of a measure such as Senate Bill No. 199 [proposing an
amendment], and I assume that since he is prohibited from vetoing the
bill the approval of the governor is not necessary. "24 The proposal was
submitted to vote without his signature and the people "vetoed" it for
him by refusing ratification in November, 1944. So the issue of gubernatorial signature was mooted for the time.
Governor Ford's view seems to have been forgotten by 1959, but
in that year similar reasoning moved the legislature to submit three
proposed amendments directly to the people without first sending them
to the governor. Legislative leaders feared that the governor might
veto one of the proposed amendments that would remove him from an
ex officio position on reorganized boards for administration of public
schools and higher education. The house speaker asked the attorney
general for an opinion on procedure, and the response was unequivocal:
1. A constitutional amendment proposed by the legislature need

not be submitted to the governor for approval.
2. Article XIX, section 9 of the Montana Constitution is complete by itself and details the steps to be taken to amend the constitution. No other requirement can be imposed.
The attorney general reported that "legal writers and cases are in agreement ....
I find no authority to the contrary . . . not a single judicial
decision in opposition to the authorities cited. . . . The rule appears
'25
to be universal.
Three proposed amendments were filed with the secretary of state
without passing through the governor's office. The legislative course

2

'Ford's letter of March 16, 1943, to the secretary of state containing the statement

excerpted above is filed with the official approved copy of S. B. 199, 1943 Legislative
Assembly in vaults of the secretary of state.
128 by
Op.ScholarWorks
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was deliberate, 26 based upon a judgment supported by reasonable interpretation of the constitution (particularly Article V § 1) and supported
by the unequivocal opinion of the attorney general. The circumstances
were a classic illustration why the governor should have no role in
proposal of constitutional amendments under the theory of "distribution
of powers" mandated by Article IV of the Montana constitution. The
legislature's approach would put Montana in line with practice elsewhere and was fully consistent with notions of the special revision
function involved.
Concerned taxpayer Livingstone promptly asked the Montana supreme court to enjoin publication of the proposed amendments, claiming
violation of four provisions of the constitution: the amendment to
divide the state board of education into two boards and to remove the
governor from both would violate the requirements of unity of subject
suggested by Article XIX, § 9, and of clarity of title required for legislation by Article V, § 23. Failure to submit the amendments to the
governor breached the "every order, resolution or vote" requirement of
Article V § 40 and the "every bill" requirement of Article VII § 12. The
entire language of the original complaint invoking constitutional provisions other than Article XIX follows:
(4) the Act violates Section 23 of Article V of the Constitution
of the State of Montana in that it contains more than one subject,
and the same are not clearly expressed in its title.
(5) the Act violates Section 12 of Article VII and Section 40 of
Article V of the Constitution of the State of Montana in that it was
never signed or otherwise approved by the Governor of the State of
Montana.'
The 28-page brief supporting Livingstone's complaint evidently thought
so little of complaint (5) that the matter was not mentioned. The brief
focused exclusively on complaint (4) that the proposed education amendment was outside constitutional boundaries of legislative discretion
about scope of proposed amendments.
At the ex parte hearing that granted a temporary injunction against
publication of the amendments, the court itself expressed interest in
process.
complaint (5) about omission of the governor from the proposal
28
point.
that
on
argument
additional
requested
The justices
"In a telephone conversation with the author August 29, 1973, the 1959 house speaker,
John J. MacDonald of Jordan, Montana, recalled legislative reliance upon MONT.
CONST. art. V. § 1 as authority to abandon prior legislative practice and thereby
avoid a possible veto of the proposed amendment. The attorney general cited
Commonwealth v. Greist, supra note 21 as a leading case on exception of constitutional amendments from provisions comparable to MONT. CONST. art. V, § 40. The
publication of the proposed amendment in Laws of Montana 1959, ch. 191 referred at
401 to the attorney general's opinion to explain absence of an approval date by
the governor; see also ch. 193 and 194.
Relator's Complaint, 4-5, filed June 6, 1960 in No. 10165, The Supreme Court of
Montana. The court rearranged and restated these contentions in State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray, supra note 11 at 553-554.
appears from statements in Supplemental Memorandum of the Relator, June
2This
15, 1960, Supreme Court of Montana No. 10165. The record suggests that relator's
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/3
counsel still did not fully credit the court's interest in omission of the governor from
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Petitioner's supplemental memorandum asserted that non-involvement of the governor in constitutional revision in "the other 49 states"
was irrelevant because "comparison only shows that [their constitutions]
are substantially different, on this particular point." The Pennsylvania
Greist case construing language virtually identical to Article V § 40 of
the Montana constitution was dismissed with the ambiguous assertion
that the Pennsylvania provision "appears to us to vary in substantial
'29
degree from the way in which Montana's constitution was framed.
The executive article of the Montana constitution did not expressly exclude bills proposing amendments from veto, so such proposals must
be subject to veto. If the framers had intended to except proposed
amendments they could easily have said so. The memorandum acknowledged that Article V § 1 exempted certain "measures" from veto, but
asserted: "This is a bill contemplating an amendment to the constitution
and does not fall into either the category of an initiative or a referendum."30 While true enough, this statement was a non sequitur and
appeared to ask the court to exclude proposals of constitutional amendments from the category of "measures referred to the people by the
legislative assembly." The memorandum pursued the matter no further
but conceivably it accomplished the purpose suggested; the court majority simply did not address the problem of reconciling their holding
with this exception clause of Article V § 1.
A deputy attorney general representing the secretary of state moved
to quash the temporary injunction. In a 20-page brief supporting that
motion, thirteen pages addressed what petitioner had identified as the
"basic issue" of allegedly diverse subject matter in the amendment.
Three pages of the brief reiterated the position the attorney general
had taken in his opinion to the legislative leaders: the governor simply
was not involved in the amendment process, anywhere, and there was
no authority or persuasion for the contrary, anywhere. Language of
Montana's Article V § 40 was like the federal constitutional provision
Hollingsworth construed in 1798, and the Pennsylvania constitutional
provision construed by Greist in 1900.
The attorney general's brief offered an argument recently persuasive
to the South Carolina supreme court in circumstances and with constitutional provisions comparable to those of Montana. The South Carolina legislature also had been submitting amendment proposals to the
governor. Two-thirds of the "members elected" in each house must pro-

proposal of the amendment. Almost half of the 14-page "supplemental memorandum" was a newly-introduced and somewhat strained argument that the bill proposing the amendment had improperly incorporated the state's election laws "by reference" when it decreed that the ratification vote would be conducted and counted
, 'in manner provided by law for general elections.'
Clements v. Hall, 23 Ariz. 2,
201 P. 87 (1921) was extensively quoted to support this proposition.
"Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 28 at 3 and 5; emphasis added.
8Id. at 13. Absence of the second "or"
between "initiative"
and "referendum"
evidently did not mislead relator's counsel as to the distinction between them.
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pose constitutional amendments. If the governor vetoed a bill proposing
an amendment, only "two-thirds of the members present" (that is one
more than half of the number required for initial proposal) could override the veto. Why then submit the proposal to the governor at all? 3 1
Some curious omissions from the paper pleadings in Livingstone
invite comment. Counsel for neither side presented its most telling
argument. Petitioner's brief failed to mention the almost unbroken
usage that had submitted legislative proposals of constitutional amendments to the governor. 32 Defendant's response omitted any mention of
the provision in Article V § 1 that seemed to except proposals of constitutional amendments from gubernatorial veto. Moreover, counsel for
each side committed most energy and space to argument of propositions
that the four-member court majority completely ignored in its opinion.
But the majority did note legislative usage as support for its holding
while the solitary concurring justice used language of Article V § 1 to
repudiate the majority opinion. So both matters may have been discussed at oral argument in June, 1960.
All members of the court agreed to make the injunction permanent
against submission of the amendments to popular vote. Justice Bottomly,
writing for himself, Chief Justice James Harrison and Justices Adair
and Castles, followed the lead opened at the ex parte hearing and held
that legislative failure to submit the proposals to the governor was "a
fatal defect" furnishing the sole ground necessary to grant the injunction.
Bottomly's decisional "fulcrum" was quoted in full and discussed
above s3 Its application led to Article V § 40 and to the conclusion that
constitutional amendments must be included among "every order, resolution or vote" to be submitted to the governor. That language was
"clear, certain, direct, and unambiguous, and . ..speaks for itself; it
needs no interpretation. '34 By simply ignoring the existence of Article
V §1 (exempting "measures" from veto, as discussed above) the majority found "no conflict [of Article V § 40] with any other provision
of our State Constitution. ''35 They could find no "exception to the

OBrief for Defendant in Support of Motion to Quash, June 16, 1960, No. 10165,
Supreme Court of Montana, citing Kalber v. Redfearn, 215 S.C. 224, 54 S.E.2d 791,
796 (1949) that, after years of legislative practice submitting proposals of constitutional amendments to the governor, such submission was not required, in part for
for the reason indicated. Emphasis added.
a Three hours in vaults of the secretary of state sufficed to establish the continuity
of that practice from 1897; earlier proposals were not readily located. Pleading
this substantial record could, of course, have brought to the surface Governor Ford 's
1943 exception and its support for the respondent's position derived from Article
V, § 1. Neither party nor the court in Livingstone appear to have been aware of
the Ford position indicated supra note 24.
8See note 19 supra.
8
O'State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray, supra note 11 at 556.
85d.
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mandatory provisions of section 40, of Article V, and Section 29, of
Article III, anywhere in the Constitution." 36
Bottomly found that the conjunction of Article V § 40 ("every
order, resolution or vote") and Article III § 29 ("mandatory and prohibitory") was "unique among state constitutions. We find no other
state constitutions which contain the same provisions as ours." Therefore, he said, decisions from other state and federal jurisdictions "are
not in point here. '3 7 That kind of logic spared Bottomly a lot of
explaining and it was more ingenious than ingenuous. If constitutional
amendment proposals were to be subjected to governor's veto, why was
Article V § 40 chosen, with its language about "every order, resolution
or vote" rather than Article VII § 12 with its "every bill" requirement ?
The latter requirement appears in almost identical form in the national
constitution and in more than forty state constitutions, and nowhere
had it been construed to cover constitutional amendment proposals.
But the language of Article V § 40 appeared elsewhere only in the
national constitution and in four other state constitutions. None of those
other constitutions happened also to be among the several that, like
Montana, recited the "mandatory and prohibitory" language of Article
III § 29.38
Resort to this unique conjunction between Article V § 40 and Article
III § 29 spared the majority the need to explain that none of the other
states with a provision like the first applied it to proposals of constitutional amendments. It also spared explanation that none of the
other states with a provision like the latter understood it to require that
"every bill" included amendment proposals among matters submitted
to the governor for veto.
The majority opinion said that Montana's constitutional founders
had not excepted proposed amendments from the sweep of Article V
§ 40 because "such an act requires a vote in each House and the concurrence of both houses. '3 9 If this amounted to more than iteration, it raised
as many questions as it settled, as do most guesses about "intent of the
framers." Did the majority assume that the Montana founders were
ignorant of the ancient and unchallenged teaching about the language

w1d.
wId. at 557; Bottomly's ambiguous statement is construed to relate to this conjunetion of sections; read more broadly it would have been a vacuous truism.
8The counterpart of MONT. CONST. art. V § 40 appeared in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7
(3); ALA. CONST. art. V, § 125; ME. CONST. art. IV, Pt. 3, § 2; PA. CONST. art.
III, § 26 (to 1968); R. I. CONST. amend, art. XV (1909); ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, Pt.
2, § 12. The counterpart of MONT. CONST. art. III, § 29 seems to have originated
in CAL. CONST. art. I, § 22 (1879), and appeared also in ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 32;
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 21; S. C. CONST. art. I, § 29; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 26;
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 29. G. & C. MIARiM Co., WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEZIATE
DICTIONARY (1949): "Oracular: 2. resembling an oracle, as in solemnity, wisdom,
obscurity, ambiguity, dogmatism."
"State by
exScholarWorks
rel. Livingstoneat v.
Murray, supra
note 111974
at 557, amphasis in original.
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they had borrowed for Article V § 40? If the founders meant that section to include constitutional amendment proposals, why did they not
express that intent, in face of the univerally accepted authority of
Hollingsworth to the contrary? Montana's founders had not borrowed
the language without heed, because they added an exception for matters
"relating solely to the transaction of the business of the two houses"
that appears in none of the comparable provisions in other constitutions.
Bottomly ignored Hollingsworth from the eighteenth century. True,
that case construed the virtually identical provision in the national
constitution, which is said to require different principles of construction
from state constitutions. But in view of the awesome 160-year authority
of Hollingsworth on virtually identical language, should not that distinction have been made, to exclude persuasion from the federal case?
Bottomly did note the contrary persuasion of Greist in Pennsylvania in
1900 construing language virtually identical to Montana's § 40. Yet he
dismissed Greist with the statement that no counterpart to either Article
40
V § 40 or Article III § 29 appeared in the Pennsylvania constitution.
What was Greist supposed to have been about?
Almost as an afterthought the majority opinion in Livingstone
mentioned "another matter" that "for almost three quarters of a century" amendment proposals had been submitted to the governor. While
this usage was "not determinative nor conclusive on this court" it suggested a common "understanding and interpretation of the constitutional
requirements and of the procedure required."' 4 1 No matter that Governor
Ford had doubts in 1943 and that the current legislature and attorney
general had repudiated that understanding.
Justice Angstman concurred in the holding of the majority because
he believed, as Livingstone counsel had pleaded, that dual subject matter
of the proposed amendment violated requirements of Article XIX § 9 for
separate proposal of different amendments. But Angstman frontally
rejected the basis for the majority opinion. He said that Article XIX
§ 9 was a "special provision" relating to amendment process, "not controlled by general provisions in the constitution and particularly not by
section 40 of Article V . . . . Special provisions control over general
ones . . . . Here the special provision dealing with amendments to the
Constitution was followed and that was sufficient [to meet procedural
requirements.]" Moreover, the language of4 2 Article V § 1 probably excluded proposals of amendments from veto.
4"Bottomly's dismissal of the Greist decision does not scan on either factual or logical
grounds. Language of PA. CONST. art. III, § 26, virtually identical in relevant portions to MONT. CONST. art. V, § 40, was extant in 1960; it did disappear from the
Pennsylvania constitution in 1968 but it was there when Bottomly said it was not.
Even in the provision had disappeared by 1960, that fact would not have diminished
the persuasiveness of the Griest decision as to its meaning when it was in the
constitution.
"State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray, supra note 11 at 557.
"2Id. at 558: "While strictly speaking a proposed constitutional amendment may not
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On its facts all Livingstone said was that the legislature must continue to send proposals of constitutional amendments to the governor.
Article VI § 10 of the 1972 constitution set this matter right, excepting
from veto "bills proposing amendments to the Montana constitution."
The new constitution also dropped the troublesome language of Article
V § 40 about "every order, resolution or vote" and deleted the oracular
caveat of Article III § 29 about "mandatory and prohibitory" intent
of constitutional provisions. Both elements of Justice Bottomly's unique
conjunction of constitutional manifestations are gone. The constitutional
underpinnings of Livingstone might seem to have been destroyed. Before
reaching such a conclusion the recent cases on the constitutional convention must be considered. They suggest that in 1974 the constitutional
logic of Livingstone might still be alive and well among all sitting
members of the Montana supreme court.
3.

The Supreme Court and Article XIX, § 8:
Convention and Constitution of 1972

The

In 1969 and 1970 the legislature and voters of Montana decided
to have a constitutional convention, the first since statehood, to draft
a new constitution. Article XIX § 8 of the 1888 constitution declared
the basic rules for this process and required the 1971 legislature to
implement the voters' decision with an enabling act. The provisions of
§ 8 for election, organization and conduct of a convention and for submission of its product to the voters were skeletal indeed for any particular stage of the complicated proocess. There was much room and
obvious need for interpretation and interpolation by the legislature and
by the convention and-it would soon appear-by the court.
But there were comparable provisions in other state constitutions
on almost every point and many of these provisions had been explored
and variously interpreted by courts of other states. Thus, on any point
that might be litigated regarding the revision process, the nature of
judicial choice in Montana would be apparent with unusual clarity
because the slate for Article XIX, § 8 was clean. Five actions within
eighteen months soon gave the court ample opportunity to exercise
judicial choice in its writings on that slate.
The 1971 legislature invited the supreme court into the action at
the outset. Legislators may have wished to forestall time-consuming litigation that could upset the complex and time-strictured scenario for
revision sketched by § 8. As they drafted the enabling act they requested

be a 'measure' within the meaning of section 1, of Article V, I think it could well
be considered as coming within the spirit of that section.'' The thrust of this essay
is that it came within the '"letter" of that secion so clearly that to take the contrary position required explanation.
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and got a declaratory judgment from the court on three questions in
February 1971.48
1. Section 8 of Article XIX required election of delegates "at the
same places, and in the same districts" as state legislative repressentatives. The court declared that this required convention delegates to
be elected in November 1971 from districts newly created after the 1970
census for 1972 legislative elections. Assuming that the 1971 legislature
met its current obligation under Article VI § 2 to reapportion legislative
districts according to the 1970 census, then Article XIX § 8 required
delegates to be elected from those "same districts." The conclusion
seemed unarguable but it meant that the legislature must complete a
reapportionment in time for filing by convention candidates in August
44
1971.
2. Article XIX § 8 required delegates to be "elected in the same
manner" as members of the house of representatives with qualifications
"the same as members of the senate." Legislators wondered if they
might provide nonpartisan nomination and election of convention delegates rather than the partisan nomination and election required by
statute for legislative elections. In Nebraska, whose constitution required convention delegates to be "chosen" (rather than "elected") in
the same manner as legislators, a 1919 decision had allowed the legislature to provide for nonpartisan election of constitutional convention
delegates. The Nebraska court had reasoned that where only party
convention or caucus nomination were known when the Nebraska constitutional requirement was adopted, it should not be construed to
have ruled out such subsequent historical developments as the primary
45
nominating elections.
The Montana court held that § 8 required observance of statutory
provisions for partisan nomination and election of representatives as
those provisions stood at the time of the convention referendum in 1970.
Subsequent election of delegates could not be by nonpartisan processes.
Voters in the 1970 convention referendum had "cast their votes on the
basis of the then existing election laws for representatives and accordingly, constitutional convention delegates." Retroactively to change
those laws "in midstream" would abridge the rights of those who had
voted in the 1970 referendum. The legislature "may not now substantially change the election laws for delegates . . . and accordingly may

4842nd Assembly v. Lennon, 156 Mont. 416, 481 P.2d 330 (1971). The Montana court
does not give advisory opinions; its discussions of jurisdiction in this declaratory
judgment action is passed over here.
"The timing got close; reapportionment legislation that defined legislative districts
in which delegate candidates would file was enacted by a second special legislative
session, Laws of Montana 1971, 2d Ex. Sess. ch. 8, approved June 29, 1971. The
filing deadline for delegate candidates was August 5 for the convention nominating
primary September 14, 1971.
OBaker v. Moorhead, 103 Neb. 811, 174 N.W. 430 (1919).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/3
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not now provide solely for nonpartisan nomination and46 election of such
delegates" as contemplated by the pending legislation.
So the court chose the more restrictive or "conservative" option.
Its argument against change "in midstream" of the revision process was
not unpersuasive, but no decisions from other states were cited to support this construction of requirements in § 8. The court's dismissal of a
contrary view in the experience of some other states was more abrupt
than persuasively argued. It was "unimpressed" by decisions the other
way in Nebraska and two other states, and brushed them aside as "entirely unwarranted" for Montana; they were distinguishable for the
"particular state history and their particular constitutional provisions. ' 47
Montanans who might wonder if the difference between Nebraska's
"chosen" delegates and Montana's "elected" delegates was a critical
constitutional distinction were not enlightened.
3. The court also declared, in response to legislative inquiry, that
elected state officials, district judges and incumbent legislators might
not serve as delegates. This view did not rest upon interpretation of
any explicit provision of Article XIX, § 8, and divergent interpretations
of constitutional prohibitions against dual office-holding in other states
afforded the court a rather obvious choice of interpretation.
Diverse Montana constitutional provisions prohibited various elected
officials from holding another "civil" or "public" office during incumbency.4 8 The court ruled that a convention delegate would hold such a
"civil" or "public" office (treating those terms as synonymous). It
followed that officials constitutionally prohibited from dual office might
not serve as convention delegates.
Courts in several states, some quite recently, had ruled that convention delegates did not possess "sovereign" powers of "public" office
for either or both of two reasons: their office was held under the
"people" rather than under the "state [government] "1;49 or they had
no "power" beyond that of making recommendations to the people.50
"42d Assembly v. Lennon, supra note 43 at 335.
'1Id. citing Baker v. Moorhead, supra note 45, Livingstone v. Ogilvie, 43 Ill.2d 9,
250 N.E.2d 138 (1969) and In re Opinion of the Justices, 76 N.H. 586, 79 A. 29

(1911).

"Specific constitutional language varied with the office: Mow. CONST. art. V, § 7
said a legislator might not hold an elective or appointive "civil office under the
state" during "the term for which he shall have been elected." Art. VII, § 4 said
none of the seven elective state executive officers could hold any other "public
office" during their "term of office" except ex officio on the board of education.
Art. VIII,§ 35 said a state or district judge could hold no other "public office"
while "he remains in the office to which he has been elected or appointed."
"A decision of the Arkansas supreme court the previous year clearly would have relieved Montana legislators from the precise stricture of MONT. CONST. art. V, § 7 as
to office "under the state." Harvey v. Ridgway, 248 Ark. 35, 450 S.W.2d 281
(1970); see also Frantz v. Autry, 18 Okla. 561, 91 P. 193 (1907); Chenault v.
Carter, 332 S.W.2d 623 (Ky. 1960).
wState v. Doyle, 138 La. 350, 70 So. 322, 323 (1915); Election Supervisors v. Attorney General, 246 Md. 417, 229 A.2d 388, 400 (1967).
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Courts in several states also had said that convention delegates lacked
the permanency of tenure required to constitute public office because
their functions ceased upon adjournment of the convention. 5 ' In 1970
the Arkansas supreme court allowed a state senator to seek election to
that state's impending constitutional convention under constitutional
strictures virtually identical to those of Montana (Article V § 7) regulating legislators. But the Arkansas decision had been four-to-three and
its majority conceded that "legal precedent does not furnish a sound
2
and clear answer to the precise question presented."
The Montana court turned back to the 1927 Barney case, 53 a leading
Montana exploration of tests to determine public office, and concluded
that convention delegates would meet all five of its tests. Clearly the
delegate's office was created by public law, with powers and duties
defined by statute or constitution, to be exercised with some independence from superior authority. Application of two other Barney tests was
conceded to be more debatable, and the court mentioned the existence
of persuasive holdings in other jurisdictions that would have exempted
Montana convention delegates from the criteria of usual public office.
Yet the court concluded that convention delegates would "possess a
delegation of a portion of the sovereign power of government" to be
exercised for the public benefit; they also would have "some permanency
and continuity" in an office that was not merely "temporary or occasional" at least during their service in the convention. 54 Convention
delegates would meet all of the Barney tests, enunciated in a 1927 case
about service of a state legislator as auditor for the state railroad commission. Justice Haswell spoke for the unanimous court:
A delegate to the constitutional convention exercises sovereign
powers of a legislative character of the highest order. That the
final product of such legislative authority is subject to referendum,
renders it no less an exercise of sovereign power. The delegation of
unlimited power is not essential to the exercise of sovereign power.
To draw a distinction between other state officers and delegates to a
constitutional convention, both of whom act as agents of the people
exercising sovereign powers in their behalf, is to deny our basic
concept of government.'

This was a revealing passage, even with all of its ambiguous bumble
about sovereignty set aside. The court's refusal to distinguish between
other state officers and delegates to a constitutional convention was
the core of its approach. Elsewhere than the Montana court, recognition
of that precise distinction between agents and processes of statutory

61Baker v. Moorhead, supra note 45; Election Supervisors v. Attorney General, supra
note 50 at 400 said a delegate was like a "male honeybee" who "performs his creative duty and then ceases to exist as a public functionary' '-with appropriate credit
to Maeterlinck.
52
Harvey v. Ridgway, supra note 49 at 283.
mState ex rel. Barney v. Hawkins, 79 Mont. 506, 257 P. 411 (1927).
"42d Assembly v. Lennon, supra note 43 at 334, 335, quoting tests from State ex rel.
Barney v. Hawkins, supra note 53.
1Id. at 334.
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and of constitutional change was a basic concept of government founded
on recognition of deep differences between legislators enacting statutes
5
and legislators proposing constitutional changes.1
A decade earlier when petitioning counsel in Livingstone had tentatively floated the surface resemblance between statutory enactment and
constitutional amendment as a kind of pre-trial balloon, the court majority seized upon that superficial resemblance and fashioned it into a
constitutional principle more dispositive for the case than the profound
differences of process, of function and of theory that distinguish constitutional revision from ordinary legislation. Two members of that
court still sat in 1971 and, although unmentioned, the Livingstone principle seems to have blocked the view back to the wisdom of the 1890s
about the distinction.
Legislators had asked the court to think ahead to a somewhat novel
future convention that would meet a year hence in familiar legislative
chambers. Again the court seized upon the superficial analogy between
legislative and constitutional change. The question before it was election
of delegates and the constitution said they must be elected "in the same
manner, at the same places, and in the same districts" as legislators.
That said little about who they might be, and nothing about their powers
and responsibilities nor what they would do as delegates. The Durfee
court of 1899 might have characterized the coincidence in mode of
election as "intermediate machinery" that must not obstruct awareness
of differences in process and function. But the 1971 court now asserted
that convention delegates would possess "powers of a legislative character
of the highest order." Patently this went beyond anything in the language of Article XIX (or of Article V on legislative powers) and mistook superficial similarities of "intermediate machinery" to conceal profound differences of function, of process and of authority that would
distinguish delegates in a future convention from members of a legislature. The court cloaked all of this confusion in a verbal drum-roll
about "sovereignty"-that penultimate ambiguity of both lawyer and
57
political orator.
"Early Montana cases had kept the distinction clearly in view, supra note 2, but the
recognition disappeared for all but concurring Justice Angstman in Livingstone,
supra note 11. The author has found nothing to qualify the declaration of the attorney general to the 1959 legislature that the distinction had been universally
recognized in the revision process they contemplated, supra note 31; see also infra,
note 116.
6742d Assembly v. Lennon, supra note 43 at 334. The term "sovereign"
appeared in
the 1889 Montana constitution as an attribute of the state (art. III, ,§ 2) rather
than of the people; on its face it was meaningless because of the obligations of the
state to the national government under the United States constitution. But art. III,
E 2 did also declare the "sole and exclusive right" of the people to govern themselves and "to alter and abolish their constitution and form of government."
We
have remarked the court's disinclination to see the "sole and exclusive right' clause
as a limitation on its own powers to participate in constitutional revision. If delegates indeed exercised ''sovereign powers on their [the people's] behalf'' this obviously was the result of the "sole and exclusive right" clause rather than any
court notion
that their functions
wereof"legislative"
or ''subject to referendum."
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So the court in Lennon chose an interpretation of delegate powers
and functions contrary to the view in a number of other states. This
choice was "conservative" in its restriction of options sought by some
legislators and potential convention candidates. It was not dictated
by the terms of Article XIX § 8, but rested upon a judicial deduction
from the logic of provisions against dual office-holding by "usual"
public officials.
The court said this prohibition would "insure independent consideration by the delegates . . . reduce concentration of political power"
in the convention and foreclose creation of new offices or higher compensation for incumbent officers who might sit as delegates. 5 Appealing or persuasive as such considerations might be, they were policy
views of the court nowhere voiced by Article XIX § 8 as criteria for
service, or for exclusion from service, as delegates to a constitutional
convention. The court got to them by way of its questionable analogy
between legislator and convention delegate. It analogized delegates to
"ordinary" public officers of determinate authority, with continuous responsibility during a fixed term, and with electoral accountability at
the end of such a term, should they seek reelection. In the lexicon of
this essay, this was a considerable exercise in doctrinal "activism."
Convention delegates were elected in November 1971 and adjourned
sine die March 24, 1972 after completing a draft of a new constitution.
Five days after that adjournment one of the delegates raised the question
reciprocal to Lennon, whether he could now seek election as state treasurer in the 1972 primary and general elections. 59 Petitioner Mahoney
seized upon language of the court in Lennon to argue that decision of
that case had not foreclosed his candidacy. The court had said that
delegates would be public officers until their duties had been discharged. Delegates met the Barney test of "permanence and continuity"
by the nature of their work "while the convention is in session and carrying out its duties. . . [A] public position need not be conceived and
created in perpetuity in order to qualify as a public officer." 60 Early
in the convention the attorney general had given a formal opinion that
convention delegates could seek public office in the 1972 primary and
general elections if "the term . . . commences after the constitutional
convention adjourns sine die." Petitioner Mahoney reiterated the attor-

The court's use of ''referendum" for what the constitution described as ''approved''
(art. XIX, § 8) or indeed the more popular term "ratification"
specifically appropriate to constitutional revision demonstrated, if anything but confusion, the pervasive hold of the analogy between legislative enactment and constitutional revision
in the court's thinking about the latter function.
GeId.
BoMahoney v. Murray, 159 Mont. 176, 496 P.2d 1120 (1972) was a petition for mandamus to compel acceptance of the delegate's nomination papers and fee to seek
lection as a state treasurer.
wId. at 1124-1125 (quoting language from 42d Assembly v. Lennon, supra note 43 at
335, with emphasis added by the petitioner).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/3
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ney general's view that "no definite duration is specified for the term
of delegate . . . the term of a delegate will last until the convention
adjourns sine die.""1
An area of respectable judicial maneuver and choice was open to
the court. With no real embarrassment it could have noted its difficulty
with application of the Barney continuity test for public office to convention delegates in the Lennon declaratory judgment of 1971. There
it had acknowledged decisions in other states that would now support
the petition of Mahoney and the recent opinion of the attorney general.
Moreover if delegate powers were held to cease at sine die adjournment
of the convention the court would have a strong ground for the decision
it would soon announce in a "companion" case already briefed and
argued before the court.6 2 But a famous legal wit once called law a
"killy-loo" bird that "insisted on flying backward because it didn't
care where it was going but was mightily interested in where it had
6 3
been."
Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Castles announced the
Mahoney decision on April 21, 1972. The opinion turned to language
of the convention enabling act to conclude that delegate terms would
extend to the expiration of that legislation and to the termination of
convention appropriations authority more than a year later on June 30,
1973. "Delegates were elected for a term ending on repeal of the act,"
Castles declared, with convention duties now held to continue at least
"through submission of its proposals to the people at an election to be
held after 'adjournment'. 6 4 The "in session" remark in Lennon did not
control Mahoney because "the Court did not have before it the situation
we have now. Rather, we have almost the reverse. '65 Indubitably.
Convention resolution 14 had prohibited any delegate "who shall
seek public office in the primary election to be held on June 6, 1972"
from serving on a post-adjournment committee of delegates to conclude
business of the convention. The convention, supported by an attorney
general's opinion, thought its members might seek elective office if
the convention adjourned two months prior to June 6, 1972. Justice
Castles construed the convention resolution:
From a reading of Section 1 [of resolution 14] it is obvious that
the Convention continues to exist. The Committee acts on behalf of
the Convention, in its place and stead. It carries on until the procedural, administrative and voter education affairs are concluded,
and the money appropriated to it has been spent. These particular
items of business are substantial parts of the business of the Committee and the Convention. It would appear that the only thing that
the Committee cannot do that the Convention did is propose further
"34 Op. Att'y Gen., Opinion No. 34, 3 (January 28, 1972).
O'State ex rel. Kvaalen v. Graybill, 159 Mont. 190, 496 P.2d 1127 (1972).
IF. Rodell, Woe Unto You, LAWYERS 20 (2d ed. 1957).
"Mahoney v. Murray, supra note 59 at 1123.
1Id. at
Published
by1125.
ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1974

23

Montana Law Review, Vol. 35 [1974], Iss. 2, Art. 3
MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

constitutional provisions or change or modify those proposed. Other
than that, the Committee has all the power of the Convention ....
We
can see no difference in what the Convention was doing before
March 24, 1972, and what the Committee is authorized to do, other
than making proposals for inclusion in the new constitution.'

This seems to have been dictum because Mahoney was not a member
of the post-adjournment committee of delegates here so generously endowed with continuing powers; and a discussion of Resolution 14 was
not required to dispose of Mahoney's petition. The language quoted was
altogether remarkable for what it gratuitously said about the powers
of the post-adjournment committee, since the powers of that committee
were the central question in Kvaalen, argued three days earlier and to
be decided only seven days after Mahoney.
Given the logic and holding of Lennon, the Mahoney decision could
have been no real surprise. Judicial choice had been narrowed but, as
delegate Mahoney pleaded, it had not been foreclosed. The choice in
Mahoney was essentially no more nor less supportable than the choice
in Lennon, regarding double office holding. It was a "conservative"
choice, tinged considerably with judicial "activism." As in Lennon,
nothing in the terms of Article XIX § 8 dictated the decision in Mahoney.
The post-adjournment committee of delegates created by convention
resolution 14 expected to spend about $45,000 for "voter education
materials" prior to the ratification election June 6, 1972. On April 7
veteran state representative Kvaalen asked the court to declare voter
education expenditures improper and to enjoin them. The court heard
oral argument April 18 and decision was announced April 28 to enjoin
expenditure of public funds for education, midway between adjourn67
ment of the convention and the date of the ratification election.
Kvaalen was represented by counsel who had persuaded the Livingstone court twelve years earlier that a provision of the legislative article
in the constitution limited process under the amendment article. The
chief justice and senior justice of the sitting court had joined the
Livingstone majority. The gambit was worth another try. Petitioner
pleaded that "all power of the convention having expired upon its adjournment sine die" it followed that "the attempt by the constitutional
convention to delegate its powers and duties, and particularly its power
to spend funds . , . after adjournment . . . is unlawful and void."68 The

argument could have been sustained to this juncture by statutory interpretation. It was converted into a Livingstone-style constitutional argument along these lines: convention powers died at sine die adjournment
Id. at 1126.
-State ex rel. Kvaalen v; Graybill, supra note 62. Petitioning as a taxpayer, farmerrancher Kvaalen was serving a sixth term as representative (Republican) of an
eastern district bordering on North Dakota. His home county and the four-county

district soon voted 58 per cent against ratification of the proposed constitution.
6'Relator's Memorandum of Authorities at 5, filed April 7, 1972 in No. 12260, The

Supreme Court of Montana.
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and could not be delegated to anyone after adjournment; delegates lost
their status as public officers at adjournment, reverting to the status
of private citizens; this brought the proposed expenditures for voter
education after adjournment within the strictures of Article V, § 35
prohibiting any "appropriation . . . for . . . educational . . . purposes
to any person ... not under the absolute control of the state." 69
Counsel for the delegate committee including sixteen lawyer-delegates
responded that the convention appropriations for voter education funds,
and the authorization of '"voter education materials" to be prepared
and disseminated by the post-adjournment committee of delegates, were
compatible with Article XIX, § 8 of the constitution and with the convention enabling act. The constitutional requirement for submission of
the proposed constitution to popular vote reasonably implied authority
"to inform the electors of the revisions and alterations it proposes."
The enabling act had directed publication of the proposed constitution
"together with appropriate information . . . in such manner as the
convention prescribes" and had directed the convention "also [to] publish a report to the people explaining its proposals." Convention resolution 5 had restricted voter education to "factual reporting of provisions
of the constitution" so that the committee function was only "to decide
the best way to disseminate" that kind of information. "Public policy"
suggested desirability of an "informed electorate" and three other state
conventions had made similar post-adjournment expenditures. In two
states these expenditures had been judicially sustained against challenge,
most notably in Missouri where "facts and circumstances are nearly
'70
identical to the facts at bar.
On April 28 the court unanimously declared that expenditure of
public funds for voter education activities by the post-adjournment committee of delegates was unconstitutional and enjoined those expenditures.7'1 Just a week earlier Justice Castles, for the unanimous court
in Mahoney, had discussed powers of the post-adjournment committee
under Resolution 14:
MONT. CoNST. art. V, § 35 were noted:
Vets Welfare Comm. v. VFW, 141 Mont. 500, 379 P.2d 107 (1963) enjoining expenditures of public funds by a veterans organization; and State ex rel. Browning
v. Brandjord, 106 Mont. 395, 81 P.2d 677 (1938) prohibiting allocation of state
welfare funds to the WPA, a federal agency "not answerable to the State of Montana."
A Supplementary Memorandum filed April 17 noted that a Rhode Island
decision enjoined expenditures for education by a public information committee
of a constitutional convention because of vagueness of the convention resolution.
Relator argued that Montana Resolution 14 "is as vague and uncertain as the one
discussed" in Sennott v. Hawksley, 103 R.I. 730, 240 A.2d 286 (1963). A Missouri
case, State ex rel. News Corp. v. Smith, 353 Mo. 845, 184 S.W.2d 598 (1945) allowing a claim for printing of an Address to the People prepared by a post-adjournment committee of delegates was "an expedient result under the circumstances"
but ''cannot be explained on the basis of logical analysis." Supp. Memo. 4.
70
Memorandum of Respondents at 4, 8, 10, 11, filed April 18, 1972 in No. 12260,
The Supreme Court of Montana, citing State ex rel. News Corp. v. Smith, supra
note 69 at 600-601, and Ops. J., 102 N.H. 565, 163 A.2d 1 (1960).
uState ex rel. Kvaalen v. Graybill, supra note 62.

-1d. at 8-9. Two decisions of the court under
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It would appear that the only thing that the committee cannot

do that the Convention did is propose further constitutional provisions or change or modify those proposed. Other than that, the
Committee has all the power of the Convention."
Seven days after this declaration the court unanimously held that "any
power and authority" the convention had "for voter education purposes
must be exercised by the convention itself and may not be delegated
to a committee." 73 But the convention "itself has no further power and
authority concerning voter education or" use of public funds "for such
purposes. ' 74 Indeed it never had possessed such powers "beyond the
75
The
specific requirements and authority found in the Enabling Act".
Act appeared to anticipate that the publication and reporting activities
of the convention contemplated in its sections 17(4) and 3(5) would
be paid for by funds appropriated to the secretary of state for a voter
information pamphlet and not from "the Convention's budget and appropriation. '76 Any authority of the convention contained in section 17(4)
and (5) for voter education had been "satisfied ' 77 when the secretary
of state published a tabloid edition of the proposed constitution with
funds appropriated to him for that purpose containing brief explanatory
comments on each section prepared by the convention, along with a
schedule of transition, a sample ballot and other information for the
voters.
Resolution 11 had commissioned this tabloid publication "as re'
quired by subsections (4) and (5) of Section 17, "78 so with preparation
and editing of that tabloid edition, there was no authority left in the
convention for additional "voter education affairs" to be delegated to
a post-adjournment committee of 19 delegates.
Various claims of the post-adjournment committee of delegates that
they possessed authority to conduct "voter education affairs" by other
media from convention funds were dismissed in this fashion:
They had no inherent powers as a constitutional convention; such
claims derived from cases decided during the American Revolution or
post-Civil War reconstruction when "there was no effective or established government to supervise the work of the convention." The cases
79
This was short
simply were "not applicable to present conditions.
Article III, § 2.
in
declared
shrift for powers of the people so generously
"Mahoney v. Murray, supra note 59 at 1126.
"State ex rel. Kvaalen v. Graybill, upra note 62 at 1133, declaratory judgment (2).
74Id. at 1136.
7Id. at 1135.
"Id. at 1131, emphasis in original.
"Id. at 1135.
"Id. at 1136, emphasis added. Query: did the court seize upon this linking of " (4)
and (5)" in language of Resolution XI, which may have been an inadvertence of
the convention, as evidence that the convention thought it had exhausted its authority
and responsibility under the enabling act? A theory of the Kvaalen holding and
opinion can be constructed on that word "and" in the resolution, and it is not clear
that this was not the court's "fulcrum" for its decision.
"Id. at 1135.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/3
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No plenary authority for voter education flowed by implication
from convention authority in Article XIX § 8 to see that its product
"shall be submitted to the electors for their ratification or rejection at
an election appointed by the convention for that purpose." The court
said "the power or duty to hold an election does not, in itself, imply
a corresponding power to educate the voters and expend public funds
therefor."8 0
Nor did the enabling act give "carte blanche power ...to expend
public funds for voter education purposes" by its Section 9 provision
that the Convention "may make such other expenditures as it deems
proper to carry out its work." The court said "if the Convention's work
does not encompass voter education, Section 9 does not authorize such
expenditure."8 1
The court brushed aside delegates' claim that an Address to the
People published by a committee of delegates after adjournment of the
1889 convention was precedent for their own voter education expenditures. The court said the claim was "drawn from tenuous, and perhaps
nonexistent facts. We find nothing in the cited convention proceedings
supporting respondent's conclusion." 82 This was a curious statement:
of course convention proceedings would not be conclusive evidence as
to post-convention matters; besides the statement was not responsive
to the fact of such a publication, accurately described by counsel for
83
the delegates.
More significantly the court declared that the Montana convention's
attempt to delegate authority to its post-adjournment committee was
"without substantial guidelines, other than [restriction to] .. .factual
reporting of the proceedings of the convention. 8 4 Except for this limitation and the fact that funds had been "budgeted for public information"
the "committee is free to expend these funds as it sees fit for voter
education activities." The state auditor and treasurer had indicated they
would honor statutory "presumption of regularity" for committee expenditures "absent a ruling by this court." 85
At this juncture, despite the ex cathedra quality of various statements like those about insufficient guidelines for delegation of authority,
the court had a rather cogently reasoned opinion resting on conventional

'Id. at 1134.
8mid. at 1134.
21d. at 1135.
81d. at 1135. One of the pamphlets, a somewhat rare and valued artifact, is in the
author's possession. Was the pamphlet, or a photocopy, not in evidence? The court
also referred petitioner's reading of State v. Smith, supra note 69, that allowed
payment of a printer's claim contracted post-adjournment for an Address to the
People. It said that decision seemed "practical" but that "its logic on any other
ground escapes us." Id. at 1135.
"Id. at 1133-1134.
BlId. at 1134.
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statutory and constitutional interpretation to support its decision against
voter education expenditures. The holding and opinion were clearly
"conservative" by the tests of this essay, but the court's reading of the
enabling act, convention resolutions and Article XIX was no more
strained than the delegates' plea for "liberal" construction of the same
materials to sustain voter education expenditures.
The constitutionally exceptionable quality of the Kvaalen holding
and opinion developed when the court went beyond the necessities of
the argument already sketched and linked the notion of insufficiently
hedged delegation to requirements of Article V, § 35. It said that "under
the circumstances disclosed here, the required 'absolute control by the
state' over its appropriation of public funds is purely fictitious."86 Delegates had argued that they were like legislators spending funds in
interim activities after adjournment, whose expenditures the court had
sanctioned in 1957.87 Both legislators and delegates were elected public
officials functioning after sine die adjournment of the parent body,
spending appropriated funds under statutory, budgetary and administrative controls of the state. The court rejected this analogy from
legislator to delegate; the 1957 legislative council case was "not applicable here" because "voter education" was involved rather than "administrative and procedural matters to conclude the Convention duties
through the election. ' 8 This was not responsive to the rather impressive
analogy delegates had pleaded regarding "absolute control by the state"
over both legislators and delegates in comparable circumstances; both
were preparing and recommending law for future adoption by some
constituted agency.
Finally, to bring a committee of elected public officers with continuing if limited public powers into the literal confines of Article V,
§ 35, delegates had somehow to become mere "persons" since they were
not a corporation, a community, or a denominational or sectarian group.
The court offered no explanation for this imaginative insertion of a
committee of convention delegates into a 19th-century period piece prohibiting legislative appropriations to private eleemosynary activities.8 9
mid.
'State ex rel. James v. Aronson, 132 Mont. 120, 314 P.2d 849 (1957).
8
0State ex rel. Kvaalen v. Graybill, supra note 62 at 1134.
8On occasion the court has insisted that constitutional provisions must be read as a
whole and in context to determine their meaning, supra note 19. The complete text
of Article V, § 35: "No appropriation shall be made for charitable, industrial, educational or benevolent purposes to any person, corporation or community not under the
absolute control of the state, nor to any denominational or sectarian institution or
association." If "intent of the framers" is a relevant consideration to determine
the meaning and purpose of a constitutional provision, § 35 was the first of a group
of five sections in Article V of the sort that swept into American state constitutions after about 1850 to lock barn doors against extensive corruption of public
finance that attended building of railroads and other internal improvements, and to
control the influence of stock corporations, banks and other trusts. See Secrist, An
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Restrictions Upon Public Indebtedness in
the United States, BULLETIN 637 (University of Wisconsin 1914); Ratchford, "Constitutional Provisions Governing State Borrowing," 32 Am. PoL. Sci. Rzv. 694
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol35/iss2/3
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It did not even recite all 35 words of § 35 to explore whether the letter
or spirit of its single sentence reasonably comprehended appropriations
to elected public officials. The article previously had served to enjoin
legislative appropriations to a veterans' organization and to a federal
public works agency which, although public, was subject to federal
rather than state controls.9 0
Why had the court again, as in Livingstone, reached out to limit
Article XIX by Article V? The constitutional assumption of relevance
between the two articles was the same in both cases. In the earlier case
the "mandatory and prohibitory" requirement of Article III § 29 furnished a bridge between them, but neither that conceptual bridge nor
Livingstone itself were mentioned in argument or decision of Kvaalen.
Was it significant that the language of Article III § 29 had disappeared
from the draft of the new constitution now before. the voters? That
section still was as much law of the constitution to limit processes of
constitutional revision in April 1972 as it had been in 1960. But it
might not be around much longer. Constitutional essences of the two
cases can be stated in equation form :91
LIVINGSTONE (1960):
XIX §9
V §40 [V§ 1]
_[]
proposed
every [ no ]
amendm't
vote
[veto]
KVAALEN
XIX §8

(1972):
V §35
-

delegate

excluded
person

III§29
+

mandatory

-[-

[III §2 ]

XIX §9

[ no

governor
signs

]

[power]

[
III§29
[+

III §2

]

mandatory

no
power

]
]

[

[

=

XIX §8
no voter
education

In any event, without reliance upon Article III § 29, this now was the
Livingstone-Kvaalen rule for constitutional revision in Montana:
(1938). Section 35 bore close historical and logical relationship to the notion that
public funds could be spent only for public purposes. See McAllister, "Public
Purpose in Taxation," 18 CALIr. L. Rav. 137 and 241 (1930), reprinted 1 Selected
Essays on Constitutional Law, bk. 5, 1 (Assoc. of Amer. Law Schools, 1938).
0Cited by relator, supra note 69.
9
'Livingstone: XIX § 9 vote proposing amendment was a vote under V § 40 that
must be submitted to the governor. Provision of XIX § 9 common to other constitutions (governor not mentioned so not included in amendment process) must be
read differently in Montana because uncommon V § 40 was in unique conjunction
with uncommon III § 29. Exception of ''measures" (amendment proposals) from
veto by V § 1 was ignored; as was III § 2 (sole power of people to amend) which
could (by its equal weight and special relevance in III) have cancelled out III § 29,
to sustain legislative discretion in ignoring the governor as an agent in proposal
of amendments.
Kvaalen: III dropped from the equation (both III § 29 to limit, and III § 2
to justify, convention discretion). Delegates under XIX § 8 were persons under V §
35 who might not receive educational appropriations; therefore there could be no
voter education activities by delegates under XIX § 8, at least after adjournment.
The court proceeded directly from XIX § 8 to V § 35 and back to XIX § 8 because nothing in either article expressly precluded application of the verbal fit
between them. Article V § 1 was not applicable to Kvaalen facts.
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1) Any provision of the legislative article verbally applicable to
limit constitutional revision agencies or processes might be so applied,
absent specific prohibitions or exception against such application.
2) Differences of authority, function and agency between legislative
enactment and constitutional revision are immaterial if the verbal fit of
constitutional limitations on legislative activity to constitutional revision
is apparent to the court.
92
In the court of first and last resort on such matters iin Montana,
one law firm had won two significant constitutional decisions separated
by more than a decade with these propositions.
What significance attaches to the fact that the same counsel won
both Livingstone and Kvaalen with novel appeals to limit Article XIX
by Article V? Only this much, probably: the court's disposition to
think by surface verbal analogy from legislative to constitutional revision processes and agencies, first manifested in Livingstone, also shaped
its holdings in Lennon when the court next thought about the matter.
Perhaps in Kvaalen the court might again traverse a now familiar conceptual track without relying on a discredited crutch like "mandatory
and prohibitory" § 29 of Article III? Counsel tried it. The court embraced it with less caution than in the earlier case.
In the context of this essay Kvaalen was "conservative" in its restriction of powers convention delegates thought they had, and "activist"
in its unnecessary resort to Article V, § 35 as ground for the decision
when more conventional grounds would have sufficed.
If this essay reads the constitutional footings of Livingstone and
Kvaalen correctly, their rule overhangs interpretation of the new constitution of 1972; all the essential elements of its application are there,
and nothing but some vaunted "populist" spirit distinguishes the new
charter from the predecessor in this context. Declarations about authority of the people to "alter and abolish the constitution and form of
government whenever they deem it necessary" are essentially unchanged.
There are fewer exception and exclusion clauses in the new charter
than in its predecessor. The "conservative" import of the LivingstoneKvaalen rule for future constitutional revision efforts appears to have
gained orthodoxy among the justices of the Montana supreme court.
All incumbents have accepted its validity and none has challenged its
authority.
Irate about the Kvaalen decision, delegates dug into their own
pockets and a citizens committee solicited private contributions to carry
on the campaign for ratification of the new constitution. Convention
-The assumption that the United States supreme court will be reluctant to review

such cases for alleged denial of a 14th Amendment right is reinforced by its re-

fusal twice to review the Montana supreme court's decision in State ex rel. Cashmnore v. Anderson- ...... Mont- ....... 500 P.2d 921 (1972).
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president Leo Graybill, Jr., a Great Falls attorney, discussed the matter
in a public forum on the University of Montana campus in Missoula.
On May 24, a newspaper reported his remarks to include statements
about "an antagonistic Supreme Court" whose members "frankly don't
like the new requirements" for their own reelection. 3 That day the
supreme court ordered Graybill to appear before it two days after the
ratification election to show cause why "disciplinary proceedings" should
not be taken. Speaking per curiam the judges reminded Graybill of
his duties to the court under lawyers' canons of ethics and said his statements as reported appeared to be "false, malicious, politically moti9' 4
vated, contemptuous and designed to mislead the public.
Some delegates protested the court's abrupt intrusion into the ratification campaign but lawyer-delegates were conspiciously silent.9 5 Whatever the tenor of Graybill's remarks or the court's declared concern
for "preserving the integrity of the judicial processes," 96 its disciplinary
powers would have been no less if invoked and exercised after the
ratification election. The court would have avoided any suggestion of
political concern with outcome of the election-the very sort of concern
Graybill was reported to have charged against the justices. Graybill responded on May 26 that he had answered student questions "frankly and
sincerely" but with no intent to convey disrespect for the court. While
not unmindful of his duties as a lawyer and court officer, he had
spoken "as a delegate and as president of the Convention, and not as
an attorney commenting on any case or judicial matter" before the
court. He suggested early disposition rather than delay to remove
"extraneous issues" from the ratification campaign and to give himself
and other lawyer-delegates "direction" how to "comport themselves"
until the election is held."' 97 That same day the court accepted his
"explanation and apology" and dismissed the proceeding.9 8 Thirteen
lines of the 19-line per curiam order restated Graybill's response and
the balance summarized the procedure for its presentation and acceptance. The order was conspicuously silent about the court's standards
or expectations for a lawyer in public office. Graybill and his fellow
lawyer-delegates not unreasonably might conclude that any criticism
by them of the court or its decisions must be accompanied by "explanation and apology."

'*Daily Missoulian, May 24, 1972 at 6 col. 1 as quoted in Per Curiam Order and
Citation In re Graybill Jr., No. 12285, May 24, 1972, Supreme Court of Montana.
"Order and Citation, aupra note 93.
"Daily Missoulian, May 26, 1972, at 1 col. 1: "Delegate lawyers contacted by The
Associated Press were cautious and unanimously chose not to comment on the court
order. I I
"Order and Citation, aupra note 93.
"Affidavit and Motion In Re Graybill, filed May 26, 1972 in No. 12285, The Supreme
Court of Montana.
"9Inre Graybill, Order of May 26, 1972, 159 Mont. 549, 497 P.2d 690 (1972).
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The provocative timing99 and ambiguous conclusion of this bizarre
episode certainly would have shocked the "conscience" of Justice Felix
Frankfurter who had instructed his colleagues on the United States
Supreme Court, the judiciary in general and the public at large about
the bitter fruits of judicial entry into the "political thicket" with its
"clash of political forces in political settlements.' '10 0 By criteria of
this essay the Montana court was both "activist" and "conservative"
In re Graybill. It had inhibited participation of at least sixteen lawyerdelegates in the ratification campaign when their professionally informed judgments about existing and proposed judicial articles would
have been peculiarly valuable to voting citizens. But this may have
been the least pervasive of its effects. Termination of the proceeding
with no advice to lawyers-in-office about the court's standards for application of lawyers' canons to their public activities created a serious
dilemma not only for such lawyers but for citizens at large. The Montana citizen must wonder whether a vote for a lawyer seeking public
office is a vote for a person partially disabled from performance of that
office by vulnerability of private livelihood if the court should conclude that official activities endangered "integrity of the judicial processes." Such considerations give unique and persistent force to the
''conservative activism" of the court in this episode.
On June 6, 1972, eleven days after disposition of the Graybill
citation, the ratification election was held in conjunction with the regular biennial primary nominating elections. A separate special ballot
presented the central issue of ratification, for or against the "proposed
Constitution," along with three special constitutional referenda (unicameral legislature, legalization of gambling, and abolition of the death
penalty). The ballot asked that electors "Please Vote on All Four
Issues" and said that "if the proposed constitution fails to receive a
majority of the votes cast, alternative issues also fail." On June 20 the
official canvass reported 230,298 votes cast on ratification with a majority of 50.55 percent of that number favoring adoption of the new
constitution. Somewhat smaller total votes were reported on each of
the three constitutional referenda.
The secretary of state had directed county canvassers to show the
"total number of electors who are listed on the poll books for the separate election on the proposed constitution" in a space labelled "number
of electors voting." On the basis of those reports the final canvass re-

"Ifmembers

of the court were in fact opposed to the.new constitution, their move
In re Graybill probably was self-defeating. Numerous observers including the author
believed that the additional attention focused upon the ongoing ratification debate,
and the "underdog" role it gave the convention president by threat to his personal
livelihood for public activity marshalled sympathy and support for the constitution
-perhaps even the slender majority it soon received in the election.
"0The Frankfurter quotations are respectively from Rochin V. California, 342 U.S. 165,
172 (1952);Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946); and Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 267 (1962).
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ported a total of 237,600 "electors voting" in the special election. Analysis of voting within counties indicated that a total of 290 more votes
had been cast in eighteen counties on the gambling referendum than
on ratification.
When the state canvass was completed June 20 the governor promptly proclaimed the new constitution to have been ratified because "a
majority of all votes cast at said election for or against the proposed
Constitution were in favor of said proposed Constitution," even as counsel for petitioners Cashmore and Burger petitioned the state supreme
court to declare that the constitution had not received the majority required by Article XIX § 9. They argued, in effect, that the 116,415
votes reported cast for ratification was only 48.99 percent of the 237,600
reported as "electors voting" in the special constitutional election. The
court heard argument on the petitions in mid-July and August 18, announced a three-to-two decision that ratification by the constitutionally
required "majority of the electors voting at the election" had occurred.
For the first time in five actions involving development of the new constitution, the court divided. The two senior justices dissented, insisting
there was "a critical fact question that no analysis short of a recanvass
by precinct can answer."''1
Justice Haswell gave the majority opinion, joined by Justices John
C. Harrison and Daly. He said:
[W]e hold that "approval[!] by a majority of the electors voting

at the election" as used in Article XIX, section 8 ...means approval

by a majority of the total number of electors casting valid ballots
on the question of approval or rejection of the proposed 1972 Montana Constitution. We hold that it does not refer to or include those
electors who failed to express an opinion by a vote on that issue.'"
The majority decision appears in effect to have substituted the
ratification formula of the new constitution for that of the 1889 constitution governing the election. For the majority the constitutionally
required total became "those voting thereon" (1972 Constitution, Article
XIV § 7) rather than "those voting at the election" (1889 Constitution,
Article XIX § 9). Haswell did not quite put the matter this way, but
he got to the position by extending the "constitutional philosophy"'1 3 of
an early Montana bond-election case to ratification of a new constitution.
Tinkel v. Griffin had argued, in 1902, that the majority that mattered
should be "of those who feel an interest in government" and that ab-

l'State ex rel. Cashmore v. Anderson, supra note 92, reproduces ballot and county
canvass forms and gives some of the canvass totals. The dissenters' statement is at
943. Additional data were derived from Report of the Official Canvass . .. At the
Separate Election for Ratification of the Proposed Constitution, June 6, 1972. See
also Waldron, Montana's 1972 Constitutional Election, MONTANA PUBLIc ArsAIas
REPORT No. 12 (June
1972), Bureau of Government Research, University of Montana, Missoula.
"'1Id. at 929; the word is "approved"
in the constitution.
10Id. at 929.
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stainers should be assumed to have acquiesced in whatever the balance
of active voters, for or against, had decided. 04
This philosophy, which the majority said "we extend to the instant
case involving Article XIX, section 8, and the multiple issue election
here involved,"' 10 5 denied the principal contention of petitioners that
all valid ballots cast on any one of the four issues in the special constitutional election must be counted in the total "voting in that election"
from which the constitutionally required majority was determined.
Haswell said that to count abstainers from the ratification issue as
"electors voting against the proposed constitution was not proper" in
the absence of some showing of clear and unmistakable intent in Article
XIX § 8 to require an exceptional majority in a multiple-issue election. 06
Chief Justice James Harrison dissented, joined by Justice Castles.
He would have granted a writ of mandamus, despite lapse of the statutory time, to require a statewide recount of the special election ballots
at the precinct level. This was needed, he said, to establish a "critical,
controlling fact" .that could not be determined from the official canvass
before the court. Where 7,302 more voters were reported as voting in
the election than the total recorded on the ratification issue, "it is impossible . .. to determine how many of that number are actual votes
cast or just ballots issued."
In other words, does 237,600 represent a net voting figure or a
"number voting" should be a net figure.'

gross figure of those receiving ballots? . . . It is clear that the

The secretary of state had precipitated the "dilemma"' 08 by calling for
the "total number of electors who are listed on the poll books" which
then was translated into the total of "electors voting." If state election
laws regarding spoiled and voided ballots "were followed meticulously,
the number of votes counted would be all good ballots and result in a
net figure." 10 9 But examination of the returns suggested that the total
was a combination of net figures in some counties with gross figures
in others." 0 The election was notably close and the effect of a recanvass
was impossible to anticipate. Counsel had presented the case "on burden
of proof and presumptions of law," but the Chief Justice said:
[T]o change such a basic document as our Constitution, a clear
cut will of the people expressed within the rules laid out in Article
XIX section 8 is mandatory and should not rest on the niceties and
subtleties of the rules on burden of proof and presumptions of law.

"'Id. at 929, quoting Tinkel v. Griffin, 26 Mont. 426, 68 P. 859, 861 (1902).
1wId. at 929.
104Id. at 928.
107
d. at 942.
1id. at 943.
mid. at 942.
uid. at 943.
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We are here concerned with hard, cold, mathematical facts which can

be determined. This court has the responsibility to see that the facts
are determined'

The majority's use of the Tinkel "philosophy" about active voting
was certainly a "liberal" position that vindicated the popular majority
who voted on the single issue of ratification. In the absence of factual
certainly about the majority of those voting "at the election" (if that
included all who cast a valid ballot on any of the four issues in the
special election) it was more "liberal" than anything but presumptions
about the latter facts could sustain. The majority conceded that "a
literal construction would seem to support relators,""11 2 who contended
there had not been the required constitutional majority. The position
of the dissenting justices to require a recount that would presumably
settle basic factual questions is not readily characterized as "conservative." Counsel seem, from the opinions, not to have squarely joined the
issue whether the matter should be resolved as a factual question or a
3
legal question, and the case may have been pleaded that way."1
Thus by a one-vote margin the court validated the painfully close
apparent verdict of the voters in a profoundly important ratification
election. For the criteria of this essay it seems best to score the judicial
approach as neutral. But the majority verdict was "liberal" in effect,
and a fair amount of doctrinal activism was apparent in its search for a
rationale to sustain its holding. The court's tradition of doctrinal activism
apparent in earlier "conservative" holdings--Livingstone, Lennon and
Kvaalen-was continued.
5.

Conclusion

Evaluations of the decisions-whether "activitist" and "conservative" or "liberal" in the defined sense' 4-are summarized in the following Table. Obviously the judgments made about the cases are normative
and persuasive only to the extent the discussion may have sustained
the particular estimates. If the decision and circumstances seemed not
to require one of the normative classifications a "neutral" classification
(-)

was assigned. The cases and decisions were not equal in importance

or impact and there is no suggestion that results of the evaluations are
susceptible to statistical treatment beyond the evident fact that they
may cumulate. The central theme of the essay has been that the modern
tm

id. at 943.
"'Id. at 927.

"sDissenters, Id. at 942:
"We were assured when we assumed jurisdiction of this
matter that no factual dispute existed. Yet . ."
Apparently as many as 20
briefs were submitted by counsel for various parties and most of these were not
available to the author; official files of the clerk of the Montana Supreme Court
along with available surplus in the hands of several counsel had been submitted
to the United States supreme court in actions that followed the instant case.
Speculatively, if neither side was confident of the outcome of a recount they may
both have preferred to take their chances with manipulation of legal concepts in
the court.

"'See material
supra noteat12.
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court has been notably "activist" and "conservative" in its approach to
the cases involving processes of constitutional revision. The Table does
suggest one corollary of this theme: the court divided only when a
majority made a "liberal" decision.

Date :

Name of Case :

1894
1899
1906
1914
1923
1924
1934

Woods
Durfee
Teague
Hay
Martien
Corry
Tipton

Judicial
Court
Approach
Activist (A)
Alignment : Restraint (R) :
Neutral (-)
3-0
3-0
3-0
3-0
A
A
3-2
5-0
5-0
COURT

MODERN
1960
1971

1972
1972
1972
1972

Livingstone
Lennon
-Districts
-Partisan Nom.
-Public Office
Mahoney
Kvaalen
Graybill
Cashmore

Nature of
Decision
Conservative (C)
Liberal (L)
Neutral (-)
C
C
L
L
L
L
C

5-0
5-0

5-0
5-0
5-0
3-2

A

C

A
A
A
A
-(A Maj?)

C
C
C
C
C
L (Maj.)

The special portent of Livingstone and Kvaalen is their principle
that the rules of constitutional change in Article XIV of the new constitution no less than Article XIX of the old constitution may be
limited by provisions of the legislative article (or elsewhere in the
constitution?) if there is a superficial verbal "fit" between such provisions and the process of constitutional revision. The Livingstone decision ignored provision of Article V § 1 that would block its application of Article V § 40 to constitutional amendment process in that
case, and it used Article III § 29 as the bridge between the legislative
rules and constitutional revision rules. Neither Article V § 40 nor
Article III § 29 had any necessary or inescapable applicability to the
issue of that case. In Kvaalen the court accepted surface similarities
between Article V § 35 and what convention delegates sought to do.
With no little distortion of § 35 it used the legislative article to limit
what elected delegates to a constitutional convention could do. What
is more it need not have restorted to Article V § 35 at all to achieve
that restriction.
In future cases involving constitutional revision under the new
constitution will the court persist in this acceptance of surface analogies
to limit the distinctive and peculiarly significant "rules of change" in 36
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Article XIV? Will it rethink the reflexive bases of its decisions from
Livingstone to Kvaalen and acknowledge what the early Montana court
saw quite clearly-that legislators are "mere machinists operating intermediate machinery" when they propose change of "organic law" that
"obtains life by the direct power of the people?" The Montana court
said that in Durfee in 1899.115
Some old and troublesome texts have disappeared from the new
constitution. The people still say they "may alter or abolish the constitution and form of government whenever they deem it necessary
(Article II § 2)." Before the court applies some constitutional provision
from outside the "rules of change" of Article XIV to restrict their
operation, it may reasonably be expected to examine very carefully
whether such an application is warranted by the functions and special
purposes of Article XIV for constitutional revision. It can ask whether
such an application is supported by something more persuasive than
a superficial verbal "fit" of some words to others. It can ask whether
application of various requirements of the constitution to the revision
article violates "separation of powers" decreed in both the 1889 constitution (Article IV) and the new constitution (Article III § 1), by
introducing into the revision scenario participants and concepts that
were not put there for good and understood reasons. Such would be
the course of judicial restraint and it is fully compatible with "conservative" stance, if the court must persist in that view of the power of
the people to change their basic law.
The Montana supreme court went out into the wilderness in its
Livingstone decision. In the world of lawyers' digests where each judicial
acorn is neither better nor worse than the next, the holding is noted
as a singular exception to the rule that executives are not part of the
constitutional revision process. 116 In the lawyers' Hooper-rating for popularity of judicial decisions, Livingstone has been cited only twice, by
the Montana court itself, to support jurisdiction in cases not involving
7
constitutional revision."
The relation between counsel and court has been mentioned in this
essay. The adage that "a lawyer will argue anything to win a case"
is probably both accurate enough and suggestive of a desirable situation.
The law grows by judicial response to imaginative pleading of counsel.
But a court is under no obligation to accept arguments without doing
its own homework and its own thinking. Proposals to limit Article XIX
uIDurfee v. Harper, supra note 2 at 585.
noSee 16 Am. JUR2D Constitutional Law § 34 (1964); 16 C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 9 at 51-52 (1956). No rubric has been found for the Livingstone-Kvaalen principle in the American Digest system; this is a kind of negative evidence as to its
uniqueness, but the author is not prepared to say that no other state courts have
made similar holdings.
niShepard's Pacific Reporter Citations, noting jurisdictional references in State ex
rel. Steen v. Murray, 144 Mont. 61, 394 P.2d 764 (1964) and State ex rel. Conrad
v. Managhan,
157 Mont. at
335,
485 P.2dof948
(1971). 1974
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by Article V may have been imaginative efforts of counsel in Livingstone
and Kvaalen, but their essentially uncritical acceptance by the court
in those cases was not by the same token evidence of well-founded
creativity in the court.
Of course it is difficult for a court to reach a sensible and principled
decision on a controversial problem of public policy in the heat of
political controversy, when there is little time for either research or
reflection. It is relatively easy to survey the battleground from the
lawyer's office or the scholar's study a year, a decade or a generation
later and say that things should have been different. But precisely
because judges are human and because their ideas are tools of decision,
what they do in the stress of decision is curiously revealing about the
pictures in their heads.
When the pictures in the judges' heads lead them in case after
case to reject responsibly held judgments of collateral agencies and
branches of government about their own authority and responsibilities,
the judges have an especially heavy obligation to impose their judicial
views only when their choices are convincingly made from sound constitutional premises and persuasively sustained by principled opinions.
The conservative nature of choices made by the Montana supreme
court in its modern cases on constitutional revision may ultimately
have to be judged in the realm of political values, but its opinions in
Livingstone and Lennon and Kvaalen and the timing and unresolved
ambiguity of In re Graybill left much to be desired as persuasive support
for decisions that thrust the court into the very center of the constitutional revision arena.
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